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California's Contributions to State 
and Local Taxation 
Frank M. Keesling* 
California is noted for many things, including various geo- 
graphical, environmental, and sociological phenomena. For ex- 
ample, the San Andreas Fault commences in Mexico and contin- 
ues northward throughout most of California. From it has ema- 
nated a great many earthquakes, one of which, with the resulting 
fire, nearly destroyed San Francisco in 1906. In terms of sheer 
beauty, it is difficult to match the Yosemite Valley-a gorgeous 
glacial-carved niche in the Sierra Nevada-or the majestic red- 
wood~,~  some of which are among the largest and oldest living 
things. Many find a walk through a redwood grove to be an awe- 
inspiring and soul-satisfying experience. The gold rush of 1849,2 
the  eath her,^ the smog,4 and weirdo cults too numerous to men- 
tion are all associated with California. 
In addition to these things, California is also noted for its 
contributions to the law. This Article focuses on California's con- 
* LL.B., 1931, Boalt Hall School of Law; various positions, 1931-1935, California 
State Board of Equalization; Counsel, California Franchise Tax Commissioner, 1935-1939; 
private practice in Los Angeles, 1939 to date. 
1. There are two species of redwoods: Sequoia sempervirens and Sequoia gigantea. 
Numerous groves of the former dot the northwest California coast, while groves of the 
latter are scattered along the western slope of the Sierra Nevada. Three of the more 
famous groves are the Mariposa Grove located a short distance south of Yosemite Valley, 
the King's Canyon National Park Grove, and the Sequoia National Park Grove located 
southeast of Fresno. The name "Sequoia" is in honor of the Cherokee Indian Sequoya, 
who created the Cherokee alphabet in the early nineteenth century. 
2. The discovery of gold in 1848 by James Marshall at Sutter's Mill on the American 
River, some 50 miles east of Sacramento, resulted a year later in an influx of thousands 
of people to California. Some came by prairie schooner, some by horseback, some by way 
of the Isthmus of Panama, others by Cape Horn, and still others from Honolulu. The 
sprawling villages of San Francisco and Sacramento were converted in a matter of months 
into fair-sized towns. The gold rush resulted also in the development of many villages in 
the Sierras, including Old Hang Town, now known as Placerville. 
3. The contrary claims of California chambers of commerce notwithstanding, on any 
given day the weather in California can be just as bad as anywhere else! By and large, 
however, it is fairly good, as testified to by the annual migration of several hundred 
thousand people to California, which has made California the most populous state in the 
Union. This statistic is prized by many Californians, but some of the oldtimers, including 
the author, liked it better in the 20'9, 30's, and early 40's before the days of traffic 
congestion, housing shortages, and the other concomitant ills of modern existence. 
4. Recently the author came across the following delightful tidbit: In undeveloped 
countries, don't drink the water; in developed countries, don't breathe the air. 
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tribution to the law of state and local taxation. 
Many of the more significant attempts to reform the law of 
taxation have originated in California. In former years the con- 
cept of a single tax created much interest. Henry George was a 
resident of California during the latter part of the last century 
when he conceived the idea of a single tax on the incremental 
increase in land values in lieu of all other taxes. The idea at- 
tracted substantial national and even international attention, 
but has never been accorded much, if any, practical application. 
In the 1930's Dr. Francis Everett Townsend led a crusade for an 
initiative amendment to the California Constitution providing for 
a single tax on gross receipts in lieu of all other taxes, and also 
for "pie in the sky" pension payments to the elderly. It was de- 
feated as the result of a massive campaign by business leaders 
and others. In 1948 another determined effort was made to adopt 
an intiative amendment to the California Constitution providing 
for a gross receipts tax, an elaborate pension payment system, a 
state lottery, and various other gambling activities. It was ruled 
off the ballot by the California Supreme Court on the grounds 
that it constituted a revision of the Constitution, which cannot 
be achieved by ini t ia t i~e.~ More recently, the impetus for reform 
has shifted to attempts to limit the level of taxation. The Jarvis- 
Gann initiative, Proposition 13,6 became law in 1978. In the opin- 
ion of many people, including the author, Proposition 13 is a poor 
5. McFadden v. Jordan, 32 Cal. 2d 330, 196 P.2d 787 (1948). 
6. The provisions of Proposition 13 may be summarized very briefly. It establishes a 
maximum tax rate on real property of 1%. Other provisions of the California Constitution 
prohibit the tax rate on personal property from being higher than the rate on real property, 
and accordingly the maximum 1% rate also applies to personal property. The basic value 
for assessing property that has changed ownership or has been newly constructed since 
Mar. 1, 1975, is the fair market value at the time of the change of ownership or the 
completion of new construction. Personal property may be assessed each year at its cur- 
rent fair market value. According to an opinion of the State Board of Equalization, real 
property owned by public utilities may likewise be assessed annually on the basis of 
current market values. In all other cases the assessed value for property tax purposes is 
rolled back to its value as of Mar. 1, 1975. A 2% increase to cover inflation is permitted. 
No other type of tax except the 1% property tax may be imposed upon real property. The 
imposition of all other taxes is severely limited. 
The validity of Proposition 13 was upheld by the California Supreme Court in Amador 
Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 583 
P.2d 1281,149 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1978). Chief Justice Bird concurred with respect to the rate 
provisions, but dissented with respect to the valuation provisions on the ground that the 
great disparity in valuation for tax purposes that the Proposition establishes offends the 
equal protection provisions of the United States Constitution. For a discussion of the 
Proposition published shortly after it was adopted, see Keesling and Ajalat, Taxing Juris- 
dictions: Before and After Prop. 13, L.A. LAW., Sept. 1978, a t  42. 
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solution to a serious problem. 
Not all of California's contributions to state and local taxa- 
tion are of the character of those just listed. On the contrary, 
many of them have been integral parts of the California tax sys- 
tem for many years, and serve to make the system fairer and more 
effective. They, together with capable administration, are largely 
responsible for the California tax system's reputation as one of 
the best in the country. 
The identity of most of the contributors is unknown. A few 
contributors, however, can be identified and should be men- 
tioned. Many of the characteristic California tax policies that will 
be reviewed herein were contributed directly, or indirectly, by 
Roger Traynor. Prior to his appointment to the California Su- 
preme Court in 1940, where he served as Associate Justice for 
twenty-four years and as Chief Justice for six years, Traynor was 
well on his way to becoming an able and nationally known tax 
lawyer. Former Chief Justice Traynor retired from the bench in 
1970. Several other ideas were contributed by Dixwell Pierce, who 
was Secretary of the California State Board of Equalization for 
some forty years. A few were contributed by the author. Finally, 
James Sabine, who served in the California Attorney General's 
office for some thirty years, first as Deputy Attorney General, and 
later as Assistant Attorney General,' deserves special credit for 
the competent advice he has given to California tax administra- 
tors over the years, and for his successful court defense of many 
of California's novel and ingenious tax policies. 
In the past, in California as in most other states, the property 
tax has been relied upon as the principal source of revenue for 
state as well as local governments. In more recent years, however, 
various other sources of revenue have been developed that greatly 
reduce dependency on the property tax. In fact, since the adop- 
tion of the so-called "separation of sources ~ys t em"~  in California 
7. Since his retirement from the Attorney General's office, James Sabine has been a 
Visiting Professor of Law at  J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 
8. An amendment to the California Constitution, adopted in 1910, provided that the 
revenues from the following taxes should be used exclusively for state purposes: (1) a gross 
receipts tax on public utilities in lieu of all other taxes on such utilities, (2) a gross 
premiums tax on insurance companies in lieu of all other taxes on such companies except 
local real property taxes, and (3) an ad valorem tax on corporate franchises and bank 
shares in lieu of all other taxes on such franchises or shares. CAL. CONST. art. 13,g 14 (1910, 
amended 1926, 1930, 1933, 1949). In 1974 art. 13 was completely revised. The current 
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in 1910, a general ad valorem property tax has not been imposed 
by the state. Although its importance has been greatly reduced 
as a result of Proposition 13 and because of various exemptions,' 
the property tax is still an important source of revenue for the 
support of local government. 
In its major outlines, California's property tax is similar to 
the property tax structures of most other states. There are, how- 
ever, a number of features sufficiently important and sufficiently 
novel to deserve comment. 
A. Possessory Interests in Real Property 
Property owned by the United States and its instrumental- 
ities is exempt from state and local taxation. The constitutions 
of most states, including the Constitution of California, accord a 
similar exemption to property owned by the state and its political 
subdivisions. It has long been held, however, that privately owned 
interests in publicly owned property, such as leases, are subject 
to taxation. 
The rule that leases and other possessory interests in publicly 
owned property, including interests in property owned by the 
federal government, are subject to taxation has been upheld by 
California courts since Californi~ was admitted to the Union in 
1850.1° In addition to leases, interests in government lands that 
are taxable include but are not limited to mining claims, rights 
to extract oil and gas, rights to cut timber, and rights to graze 
sheep or cattle. 
- -  
provisions relating to the taxation of banks are in art. 13, 8 27 as amended in 1976. 
9. California has the usual clutter of exemptions for publicly owned property, prop- 
erty used for charitable, religious, educational, and various nonprofit welfare purposes, 
and to a limited extent, property owned by veterans. In addition, California now exempts 
completely all of the following property: stocks, bonds, notes, mortgages, and other intan- 
gible property; household furniture, including art objects; money; and inventories. See 
generally CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE 89 201-233 (West 1970 & Supp. 1979). 
10. See People v. Shearer, 30 Cal. 645 (1866); People v. Morrison, 22 Cal. 74 (1863); 
Hall v. Dowling, 18 Cal. 619 (1861); State v. Moore, 12 Cal. 58 (1859). 
In Moore the court upheld a tax on the possessory interest in a mining claim on land 
owned by the United States. Shearer involved the taxation of claims to publicly owned 
land that had not been perfected. Although the court clearly recognized that the property 
was still owned by the United States, it upheld the taxability of unperfected claims. The 
claimants had made improvements, had been in possession some 6 to 10 years or more, 
derived substantial revenues from such claims, and held possession against everyone 
except the true owner. 
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B. Valuation of Possessory Interests in Real Property 
The value of privately owned leases of publicly owned real 
property is often determined by the "capitalization-of-net- 
income" method. Under this method an estimate is made of the 
net income to be produced by the property over the period of the 
lease. The present-day value of the right to receive such income 
is then determined. This amount is considered to be the value of 
the lease. 
In determining the estimated net income to be produced over 
the period of the lease, it was the practice for many years to allow 
a deduction for the rent payable under the lease and also for 
amortization of improvements, if any, made by the lessee. Both 
such items, of course, are deductible for income tax purposes. A 
number of California cases held that such items were likewise 
deductible in determining the value of a lease for property tax 
purposes. 
Eventually, however, the Assessor of San Diego County dis- 
allowed a deduction for both of the items. In De Luz Homes, Inc. 
v. County of Sun Diego,12 the California Supreme Court unani- 
mously reversed its former view as to the proper treatment of rent 
and amortization of leasehold improvements. The court's views 
were expressed in a comprehensive opinion by Justice Traynor. 
These items were held not deductible because they constitute a 
part of the cost or purchase price of the interest being valued. In 
the words of Justice Traynor, "Rent paid for a leasehold interest, 
like the cost of improvements that revert to the lessor, is part of 
the cost or purchase price of the leasehold, and to include a de- 
duction for it, is likewise to include an item of expense based on 
the answer, i.e., the value of the property."13 
The De Luz case is a landmark. It resulted in an enormous 
increase in the taxable values of privately owned leases in pub- 
licly owned real property. It received a great deal of attention and 
was bitterly criticized for some time after the decision. It seems 
eminently sound, however, and is still the law of California with 
respect to leases entered into after the case was decided.14 
11. See L.W. Blinn Lumber Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 216 Cal. 474, 14 P.2d 512 
(1932); Hammond Lumber Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 104 Cal. App. 235, 285 P. 896 
(1930). 
12. 45 Cal. 2d 546, 290 P.2d 544 (1955). For a discussion of this case as well as the 
subject of taxation of possessory interests generally, see Keesling, Roperty Taxation of 
Leases and Other Limited Interests, 47 CALIF. L. REV. 470 (1959). 
13. 45 Cal. 2d at 567, 290 P.2d at 558. 
14. Shortly after De Luz was decided, the California Legislature enacted a statute 
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The capitalization-of-net-income method for the determina- 
tion of the value of a leasehold interest in publicly owned property 
presents difficult problems, particularly when the property is 
used in the conduct of a business. In such cases it is necessary to 
estimate the amount of net income attributable to the property 
as distinguished from the amount of net income attributable to 
the services of personnel engaged in the business and the amount 
of net income attributable to capital invested in the business. 
This is a formidable task and often fraught with uncertainty. 
There is a simpler method for determining the value of a privately 
owned lease in publicly owned property: (1) determine the value 
of the publicly owned property in much the same manner as 
would be done if the property were privately owned and subject 
to taxation, (2) determine the present value of the remainder 
interest a t  the expiration of the lease by use of actuarial tables, 
and (3) subtract the value of the remainder interest so deter- 
mined from the value of the entire property to obtain the value 
of the lease? 
The simpler method can be illustrated by an example. A 
public agency leases land to X for a period of ten years. A survey 
of the selling price of comparable property in the area indicates 
that the land is worth $100,000. According to actuarial tables, 
using six percent as a reasonable rate of return, the remainder 
interest, which is exempt from tax, has a present value of $54,000. 
The $46,000 difference between this figure and the total value of 
the property represents the value of the lease subject to tax. If a 
higher rate of return than six percent is employed, the value of 
the remainder interest will be reduced and the value of the lease 
will be increased. Thus, if a nine percent rate of return is used, 
the value of the remainder in the above example would be 
$42,000, and the value of the lease would be $58,000. This method 
of determining the value of a privately owned lease of publicly 
providing that the case should be applied only in valuing leases entered into after the date 
of the decision and that the former rule should be applied in determining the value of 
leases entered into prior to the case. Notwithstanding that the California Constitution and 
not the legislature controls the taxation of real property, the statute was held valid by the 
California Supreme Court in an opinion by Justice Traynor in Forster Shipbldg. Co. v. 
County of Los Angeles, 54 Cal. 2d 450,353 P.2d 736,6 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1960). This case has 
become something of an authority on the power of a legislature to provide that overruling 
decisions shall not be applied retroactively. See also Texas Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 
52 Cal. 2d 55, 338 P.2d 440 (1959) (opinion by Justice Traynor). 
15. This simplified method of determining the value of a privately owned lease of 
publicly owned property had previously been suggested by the author. See Keesling, note 
12 supra. 
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owned property was upheld by the California Supreme Court in 
Riverside County u. Palm-Ramon Development Co. 
C. Possessory Interests in Personal Property 
In connection with the construction of ships and airplanes, 
the federal government often arranges to purchase and hold title 
g 
to the machinery and equipment necessary to perform the con- 
struction work and ~ a k e s  such items available to the construc- 
tion companies. The presumed purpose of such an arrangement 
is to avoid the personal property taxes which would be assessed 
if the construction companies purchased such items themselves. 
One might reasonably expect that insofar as the taxation of pos- 
sessory interests is concerned there should be no difference be- 
tween real property and personal property. Thus, one might ex- 
pect that construction contractors could be taxed on the value of 
the right to use the machinery and equipment purchased by the 
government and made available to them. a 
In General Dynamics Corp. u. County of Los Angelesu the 
California Supreme Court, again in an opinion by Justice Tray- 
nor, held that so far as the California Constitution is concerned 
there is indeed no difference with respect to the taxation of pos- 
sessory interests in real and personal property. The opinion points 
out, however, that statutes enacted by the legislatures over the 
years have drawn a distinction. The statutes have consistently 
provided for taxing the right to the possession of real property, 
but with no similar provision for personal property. This omis- 
sion, the court concluded, "reflects not merely a lack of detail, 
but a consistent pattern of taxing tangible personal property as 
an entity or not at all."18 It is clear from the court's opinion that 
the legislathre could provide for the taxation of privately held 
possessory interests in publicly owned personal property. More- 
over, the legislature could possibly go even further and subject 
the person in possession to a tax on the full value of such prop- 
erty, including the value of the publicly held remainder interest 
as well as the value of the privately held possessory interest. 
In a sense the opinion of the court in General Dynamics 
constituted an invitation to the legislature to act. The legislature, 
however, has not acted and as a result possessory interests in 
16. 63 Cal. 2d 534, 537, 407 P.2d 289, 292, 41 Cal. Rptr. 377, 380 (1965). 
17. 51 Cal. 2d 59, 330 P.2d 794 (1958). 
18. Id. at 65, 330 P.2d at 797. 
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publicly owned personal property, unlike possessory interests in 
publicly owned real property, are not taxed. 
D. Leases of Personal Property Title of Which 
Is Held by Insurance Companies 
In California, as in most states, insurance companies are 
subject to a gross premiums tax for state purposes in lieu of all - 
other taxes except taxes on real property. Thus, personal property 
owned by such companies is exempt. 
Many insurance companies use their reserves to construct 
their own office buildings. Space not used by the company itself 
is leased to other parties. In an effort to obtain an exemption from 
taxation of furniture and equipment needed by tenants, some 
insurance companies arrange to purchase those items and make 
them available to the tenants under the terms of a lease with, of 
.course, an appropriate adjustment in the rent. Suppose, for ex- 
@ ample, an insurance company leases an entire floor in an office 
building owned by it to a large oil company to be used as the 
tenant's executive offices. The oil company plans to purchase 
furniture and equipment including electric typewriters, book- 
keeping machines, computers, etc., at a total cost of approxi- 
mately $500,000. At the tax rates prevailing in California until 
Proposition 13, the annual tax would amount to between $15,000 
and $20,000 per year if the property were purchased and owned 
by the tenant. Arrangements are made, however, whereby the 
tenant gives the insurance company a list of the items it plans to 
acquire, and the insurance company makes the purchase. Since 
the personal property of insurance companies is exempt from tax, 
the property in this example, so it is commonly believed, is ex- 
empt from tax. 
In view of General Dynamics this claim for exemption cannot 
be defeated on the theory that the tenant has a taxable possessory 
interest in the personal property. There are, however, other theo- 
ries available to support a tax on the entire value of the property. 
In some instances it may be possible to establish that the lease 
arrangement is a sham, that the insurance company simply acted 
as an agent for the tenant in purchasing the furniture and equip- 
ment, and that in truth and in fact, as well as in law, the property 
is owned by the tenant. 
In other cases, it may be possible to establish that the lease 
actually constitutes a sale from the insurance company to the 
tenant because the tenant acquires the right to use the property 
for a period substantially equal to its useful life. If, for example, 
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the term of the lease is for a period of eight years or more and the 
furniture and equipment has an estimated useful life of ten years 
or less, which is usually the case, the tenant should be considered 
as the owner of the property and the property should be fully 
subject to tax. The Internal Revenue Service has long held that 
a person who has the right to the possession of personal property 
for a period substantially equal to its useful life should be consid- 
ered the owner for federal income tax purposes even though the 
transaction whereby possession is acquired is called a lease.lB 
This proposition is also supported by the opinion in General 
Dynamics where Justice Traynor indicated that under given cir- 
cumstances the right to the possession of property may be treated 
as the equivalent of ownership even though the transaction is 
given a different label? Justice Traynor gave careful considera- 
tion to whether the taxpayer in that case should be considered the 
owner of the property, even though title was held by the United 
States. He pointed out that the United States exercised close 
supervision and control over the property and for that and other 
reasons the taxpayer did not become the owner of the property. 
In other cases, such as those involving so-called leases of personal 
property from insurance companies, a different conclusion might 
well be reached. 
E. Movable Instrumentalities of Interstate 
and Foreign Commerce 
The question as to jurisdiction to tax movable instrumental- 
ities of interstate and foreign commerce, such as ships, rolling 
stock of railroads, and airplanes, has long been a subject of con- 
troversy and confusion. For many years the United States Su- 
preme Court held that in the absence of a permanent situs in 
some other state or country, such property could be taxed only 
in the state or country of the owner's domicile or the home port 
of the property. 
In Hays v.  Pacific Mail Steam-ship Co." the County of San 
Francisco, shortly after California was admitted to the Union, 
attempted to tax a vessel operating between New York, San Fran- 
cisco, and ports in the Territory of Oregon. The vessel apparently 
spent considerable time in San Francisco. The tax was assessed 
in the belief that it had acquired a permanent situs in the County 
19. See Rev. Rul. 55-541, 1955-2 C.B. 19. 
20. 51 Cal. 2d at 67-68, 330 P.2d at 798-99. 
21. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 596 (1854). 
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of San Francisco. The United States Supreme Court held that the 
vessel could be taxed only in the State of New York where the 
owner was domiciled and where the vessel had its home port. 
The case of Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentuckyn was con- 
cerned with the jurisdiction to tax twenty vessels owned by the 
company, two of which operated between New Orleans and Ha- 
vana, five between New York and New Orleans, and thirteen 
between New York, New Orleans, and Galveston. The company 
was incorporated in Kentucky in 1884, and at the time the case 
arose still had its principal place of business in that state. The 
vessels were enrolled in New York and bore on their sterns the 
name of that port. The Supreme Court first considered whether 
the vessels had acquired a permanent situs in New York, and 
answered that question negatively. The Court then proceeded to 
hold that Kentucky, as the domiciliary state, had jurisdiction to 
tax the vessels even though they had never been and probably 
never would be physically present there. 
In Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.  Minnesotaz3 the jurisdictional 
rules applicable to the taxation of oceangoing vessels were ex- 
tended to aircraft. Thus Minnesota, as the home port of a fleet 
of aircraft operating in interstate commerce, was held to have 
jurisdiction to tax the entire fleet. 
The Supreme Court has upheld the jurisdiction of states 
other than the state of domicile to tax the rolling stock of rail- 
roads on an apportionment basis since 1891. The apportionment 
basis gives recognition to the fact that although a particular item 
of property may not be in a state permanently, certain items of 
similar property may be present in the state more or less continu- 
ously. Under this method an effort is made, by the use of an 
appropriate formula, to determine the average number of items 
of property within the taxing state throughout the year. This 
amount is considered to have acquired a situs in the state for the 
purpose of taxation. 
The apportionment rule was first upheld by the United 
States Supreme Court in Pullman's Palace Car Co .  v. 
Penn~ylvania .~~ It was subsequently upheld in numerous other 
cases involving rolling stock. In Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge 
Line Co." the home-port doctrine was repudiated and the appor- 
-- 
22. 222 U.S. 63 (1911). 
23. 322 U.S. 292 (1944). 
24. 141 U.S. 18 (1891). 
25. 336 U.S. 169 (1949). 
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tionment method upheld as applied to tugs and barges operating 
on inland waterways. In the course of its opinion, the Court 
stated: 
We see no practical difference so far as either the Due Process 
Clause or the Commerce Clause is concerned whether it is ves- 
sels or railroad cars that are moving in interstate commerce. The 
problem under the Commerce Clause is to determine "what 
portion of an interstate organism may appropriately be attrib- 
uted to each of the various states in which it functions." . . . 
So far as due process is concerned the only question is whether 
the tax in practical operation has relation to opportunities, ben- 
efits, or protection conferred or afforded by the taxing 
State. . . . Those requirements are satisfied if the tax is fairly 
apportioned to the commerce carried on within the State.26 
Predictably, in Braniff Airways, Inc. u. Nebraska State Board of 
Equalizationn the apportionment method was also held to apply 
to aircraft flying in interstate commerce. 
If property is taxable by the state of domicile and also by 
other states on an apportionment basis, double taxation will re- 
sult. In Standard Oil Co. v. Peck28 the Court solved this dilemma 
by holding that property taxable in two or more states on an 
apportionment basis may not be taxed in the state of domicile. 
Thus, the Court applied the same rule that has long been recog- 
nized in the case of property that has acquired a tax situs in some 
state other than the state of domicile by virtue of being perma- 
nently located in the other state. 
In Scandinavian Airlines System, Inc. u. County of Los 
AngelesZ9 the California Supreme Court had occasion to consider 
whether the apportionment method could be applied in the case 
of airplanes that were owned, based, and registered in one or 
another of three Scandinavian home ports, were operated exclu- 
sively in foreign commerce, were taxed by the country in which 
the home port was located, and were physically present in the ' 
taxing county and city (Los Angeles) on only eight occasions dur- 
ing the year. The majority of the court, in an opinion by Justice 
Peters, held that the apportionment method could not be used 
and that the planes were taxable only by the foreign countries in 
26. Id. at 174 (citations omitted) (quoting Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 
310 U.S. 362, 365 (1940)). 
27. 347 U.S. 590 (1954). See also Flying Tiger Line, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 51 
Cal. 2d 314, 333 P.2d 323 (1958). 
28. 342 U.S. 382 (1952). 
29. 56 Cal. 2d 11, 363 P.2d 25, 14 Cal. Rptr. 25 (1961). 
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which the owners were domiciled and in which the planes had 
their home ports. In fact, Justice Peters' opinion indicated that 
instrumentalities operating on or over the high seas, whether in 
interstate or foreign commerce, cannot be taxed by the apportion- 
ment method: 
The language and rationale of the decisions create the inference 
that, should the United States Supreme Court be presented 
with a situation involving airplanes engaged in foreign com- 
merce, or planes engaged in interstate commerce via interna- 
tional routes, it would apply the same doctrines it has consis- 
tently applied to ocean-going vessels similarly engaged? 
In his opinion Justice Peters referred to the possibility of 
double taxation as a reason for prohibiting the application of the 
apportionment method to instrumentalities of foreign commerce. 
He pointed out that in the case of foreign commerce, unlike inter- 
state commerce, the courts of this country cannot prevent double 
taxation by prohibiting taxation at the domicile of the owner or 
the home port of the instrumentalities in question. For this and 
other reasons he concluded that foreign commerce is peculiarly a 
concern of the federal government and that in the absence of 
treaties or congressional legislation specifically permitting taxa- 
tion, state taxation of instrumentalities engaged in foreign com- 
merce is not permissible. 
Justice Traynor wrote a vigorous dissenting opinion, con- 
curred in by Chief Justice Gibson. Justice Traynor discussed at 
considerable length the reason why foreign commerce and inter- 
state commerce should be treated alike for state taxation pur- 
poses. He pointed out that when the home-port doctrine with 
respect to vessels operating in interstate or in foreign commerce 
originated years ago, the apportionment method had not yet been 
formulated. Since then the use of apportionment in interstate 
I commerce has been firmly established. If not applied to instru- 
mentalities employed in foreign commerce, the result would 
clsarly discriminate against interstate commerce. 
With respect to the argument that application of the appor- 
tionment method for foreign commerce may result in double tax- 
ation, he stated emphatically: 
This argument erroneously attributes to such taxation the risk 
of discrimination. Actually it is attributable to the freedom of 
foreign countries, not permitted to our own states, to adopt rules 
30. Id. at 28, 363 P.2d at 35, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 35 (footnote omitted). 
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of their own that can result in multiple burdens. The court 
cannot prevent foreign countries from taxing instrumentalities 
of foreign commerce owned by their domiciliaries even if those 
instrumentalities are permanently located here, just as it cannot 
prevent foreign countries from taxing American aircraft tempo- 
rarily abroad even though they have been taxed a t  full value a t  
the domicile of their owners here. It is without power to compel 
independent nations to adopt a uniform nondiscriminatory sys- 
tem of taxation. It does not follow that the states must forego 
the power to impose taxes that are not in themselves discrimina- 
tory. It bears noting that Congress remains free to prohibit alto- 
gether state taxation of instrumentalities of foreign commerce. 
Alternatively, treaties could govern such taxation to preclude 
the risk of dis~rirnination.~' 
Justice Traynor's analysis is much preferable to that of Jus- 
tice Peters. The apportionment method permits taxation by the 
jurisdiction where the property is physically present and which 
gives it protection. If all jurisdictions employed it, there would be 
neither double taxation nor discrimination against one form of 
commerce in favor of another. The federal government should 
endeavor to negotiate treaties with various other countries requir- 
ing that this method be used. 
In Sea-Land Service, Inc. v .  County of Alameda32 the Califor- 
nia Supreme Court was presented with the question whether the 
apportionment method can be applied in the case of sea vans 
employed in both interstate and foreign commerce and owned by 
a corporation organized in Delaware and having its principal 
place of business in New Jersey. The court unanimously upheld 
the apportionment method and distinguished Scandinavian 
Airlines on several grounds. First, in Scandinavian Airlines the 
planes were operated exclusively in foreign commerce, whereas 
the sea vans in Sea-Land were used in interstate commerce as 
well as foreign commerce. In addition, the aircraft in 
Scandinavian Airlines had only minimum contacts with Los An- 
geles, the jurisdiction that sought to tax them, whereas the con- 
tainers involved in Sea-Land had a daily contact with Alameda 
County and the City of Oakland. 
In Japan Line, Ltd. v .  County of Los Angeles" the California 
Supreme Court again considered the application of the appor- 
tionment method to sea vans continuously in the taxing jurisdic- 
31. Id. at 44-45, 363 P.2d at 45, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 45 (Traynor, J., dissenting). 
32. 12 Cal. 3d 772, 528 P.2d 56, 117 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1974) (en banc). 
33. 20 Cal. 3d 180,571 P.2d 254,141 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1977), rev'd, 441 US. 434 (1979). 
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tion. In this case, unlike Sea-Land, the owner of the vans was 
domiciled in a foreign country, Japan, the vans had their home 
port there, they were used exclusively in foreign commerce, and 
they were taxed in Japan. Thus, the issue presented was identical 
to that presented in Scandinavian Airlines. A unanimous court 
upheld the tax. It is apparent from both the decision and the 
opinion that the court was more favorably impressed with Justice 
Traynor's dissenting opinion in Scandinavian Airlines than with 
the majority opinion of Justice Peters. 
So far, so good. If the United States Supreme Court had 
upheld the California Supreme Court, all instrumentalities of 
commerce, insofar as United States taxes are concerned, would 
have been taxed alike regardless of whether used in interstate 
commerce, foreign commerce, or partly in both, and likewise re- 
gardless of where the owner is domiciled and where the instru- 
mentalities' home port is located. Such a decision upholding the 
use by a state of the apportionment method would have provided 
a substantial incentive to foreign countries using the home-port 
doctrine to eliminate double taxation by either abandoning the 
doctrine or entering into treaties with the United States prohibit- 
ing its use and substituting the apportionment method. 
Unfortunately, the United States Supreme Court, somewhat 
surprisingly, reversed the California Supreme Court,34 thus re- 
moving any incentive on the part of foreign countries to abandon 
their antiquated conceptions of jurisdiction. In an uninspired 
opinion, the Court emphasized that commerce with foreign coun- 
tries is a matter of peculiar concern to the federal government. It 
completely disregarded Justice Traynor's view as to responsibil- 
ity for the risk of double taxation as between the home-port doc- 
trine and the apportionment method. It simply repeated Justice 
Peters' point regarding the California court's inability in the case 
of foreign commerce to prevent double taxation by prohibiting 
the use of the home-port doctrine. 
As a result of the Supreme Court decision there are only two 
areas where there can be any certainty as to the jurisdiction of 
the states to tax instrumentalities of foreign or interstate com- 
merce. One of these is in cases that present the same basic factual 
situation as was presented in Scandinavian Airlines and Japan 
Line, i.e., the owner of the instrumentalities is domiciled in a 
foreign country, the instrumentalities have their home port in the 
34. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979). 
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foreign country, they are used exclusively in foreign commerce, 
and they are taxed by the foreign country. In these cases the 
states are without jurisdiction to tax. The other situation occurs 
where the instrumentalities are owned by a corporation domiciled 
in one of the states and are used exclusively in interstate com- 
merce on or over land or inland waters. In such cases the states 
may tax on an apportioned basis only. In all other cases the 
question of the jurisdiction of the states to tax is left by Japan 
Line in a state of considerable uncertainty. A few of the possible 
fact patterns will be briefly discussed. 
1 The facts are the same as those in Scandinavian Airlines 
and Japan Line, except that the instrumentalities are not taxed 
by the foreign country. Although one cannot be certain as to the 
answer, from a careful reading of the Supreme Court's decision 
it is possible to glean some support for the proposition that the 
possibility alone of foreign taxation-even without actual taxa- 
tion-is sufficient to prohibit the states from using the apportion- 
ment method in the case of foreign-owned instrumentalities used 
exclusively in foreign commerce .35 
2. The factual situation is the same as in Scandinavian 
Airlines and Japan Line, except that the instrumentalities are 
used not only in foreign commerce between the country of the 
owner's domicile and the United States, but are also used in 
interstate commerce between various states and may or may not . 
be taxed by a foreign country. This example presents a closer 
question than the previous one. Surely one might think that the 
states should have jurisdiction to tax instrumentalities used in 
interstate commerce. However, there is the same risk of foreign 
taxation and hence double taxation as in the case of foreign- 
owned instrumentalities employed exclusively in foreign com- 
merce. This circumstance may well lead the Court to extend its 
decision in Japan Line to all foreign-owned instrumentalities op- 
erating in foreign commerce notwithstanding that they may be 
used in interstate commerce as well. 
3. The foreign-owned instrumentalities operate exclusively 
in interstate commerce on or over international waters, such as 
ships or aircraft operating between various mainland states and 
Hawaii, or between Alaska and other states on the West Coast. 
It may be recalled that Justice Peters, whose views obviously 
found favor with the United States Supreme Court in Japan Line, 
35. Id. at 447-48. 
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predicted that if such a case ever came before the United States 
Supreme Court, it would uphold the home-port doctrine to the 
exclusion of the apportionment method." 
4. The owner of instrumentalities of commerce is domiciled 
in one of the states and the instrumentalities have their home 
port in the same state. The instrumentalities are used exclusively 
in foreign commerce. Insofar as ownership and home port are 
concerned, this is the converse of Scandinavian Airlines and 
Japan Line. One might expect a converse answer, i.e., that such 
instrumentalities could be taxed by the state in which the owner 
is domiciled and the instrumentalities have their home port to the 
exclusion of taxation elsewhere. However, as Justice Traynor 
pointed out in his dissenting opinion in Scandinavian Airlines, in 
such a case as well as others, the courts of the United States are 
unable to control the taxation of instrumentalities of commerce 
by foreign countries. It is certainly possible that sooner or later 
some foreign country may develop the practice of applying the 
apportionment method to instrumentalities of commerce more or 
less continuously within their borders even though they are 
owned and domiciled elsewhere. Accordingly, taxation by the 
state of domicile or home port would involve the risk of double 
taxation. There is nothing in the opinion of the Court in Japan 
Line to suggest that the decision turned on foreign domicile and 
that a different answer would result in a case where the instru- 
mentalities of foreign commerce are owned by a domiciliary of the 
United States. Thus, the Court may forbid taxation by the state 
of domicile or home port of instrumentalities of foreign com- 
$ 
merce. 
Whether or not the states can tax on an apportioned basis is 
questionable. Just as San Francisco in the Hays case endeavored 
to tax the entire value of a vessel within the county even though 
the owner was domiciled elsewhere, so some foreign country may 
endeavor to tax vessels present within that country even though 
the owner is domiciled in the United States or some other coun- 
try. In Hays the United States Supreme Court denied San Fran- 
cisco the right to tax, but the courts of some foreign country may 
well reach a different conclusion. Hence it is at least arguable 
that state taxation on an apportioned basis is forbidden because 
of the possibilities of double taxation involved. 
5. Instrumentalities of commerce operating in both foreign 
36. 56 Cal. 2d at 36, 363 P.2d at 40, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 40. 
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commerce and interstate commerce are owned by a domiciliary 
of one of the states and the instrumentalities have their home 
port in the same state. This factual situation includes an enor- 
mous volume of property worth untold billions of dollars. It in- 
cludes instrumentalities of many major airlines and many major 
shipping lines as well. It is no exaggeration to state that the 
question as to the jurisdiction of the states to tax the instrumen- 
talities of these lines operating in both interstate and foreign 
commerce presents the most serious property tax problem that 
has ever existed at any time in the United States. In view of the 
United States Supreme Court's decision in Japan Line, one can 
only conjecture as to how the problem will be solved. 
F. Public Utility Property 
Under the "separation of sources system"37 adopted in Cali- 
fornia in 1910, public utilities became subject to a tax on gross 
receipts, to be used exclusively for state purposes, in lieu of all 
other taxes including local property taxes. This arrangement was 
not a success. There was a widespread belief that by playing 
politics, public utilities were able to keep the rate of gross receipts 
tax so low that the utilities did not bear their fair share of the tax 
burden. Furthermore, even back in the 20's and early 30's when 
tax rates were relatively low compared to modern standards, 
there were widespread complaints concerning high local property 
taxes. In addition, the public schools needed additional funds. 
In 1933 Dixwell Pierce, Secretary of the State Board of 
Equalization, which administered the gross receipts tax, con- 
ceived a program that came to be known as the Riley-Stewart 
Plan? It provided for the repeal of the gross receipts tax and the 
return of public utility property to local tax rolls, thereby broad- 
ening the tax base and, hopefully, resulting in lower tax rates. It 
also provided for the enactment of a general sales tax to replace 
the revenue that would otherwise have been produced by the 
gross receipts tax and to provide additional funds to distribute to 
local school districts. A constitutional amendment incorporating 
many of these proposals was adopted in June 1933?@ 
One important feature of the program was a provision requir- 
ing public utility property to be assessed centrally by the State 
37. See note 8 and accompanying text supra. 
38. Riley at the time was State Controller and ex-officio member of the State Board 
of Equalization. Stewart was a member of the board. Both men are now deceased. 
39. See CAL. CONST. art. 4, 8 34a, art. 11, 88  12, 20, art. 13, 88  14-16. 
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Board of Equalization. This provision, which also originated with 
Dixwell Pierce, was a stroke of genius. Utility property often ex- 
tends into numerous taxing jurisdictions such as counties, cities, 
school districts, flood control districts, and many other special 
taxing agencies. Often, such as with railroads, telephone and tele- 
graph lines, and express companies, public utility property ex- 
tends into other states as well. The task of determining the value 
of the entire system and then determining how much of that value 
is attributable to the portion of the system within each of the 
numerous local taxing districts is hopelessly beyond the ability of 
most local assessors. Furthermore, the requirements of furnishing 
the necessary information to numerous local assessors imposes 
substantial burdens upon the utilities. These problems are solved 
by central assessment of utility property, which permits the de- 
velopment of an adequate staff of experienced personnel. Over 
the years the provision for central assessment has worked exceed- 
ingly well and there has been little, if any, criticism of it. 
G. Motor Vehicles 
For many years in California, motor vehicles, including 
trucks, were assessed and taxed locally the same as other personal 
property. In cases where the taxes were secured by real property, 
and also where the taxes were unsecured but were substantial in 
amount, it was usually possible for local tax collectors to effect 
collection without much difficulty or expense. But in cases where 
the tax on motor vehicles was both unsecured and relatively small 
in amount, collections were poor. In these cases the owners of 
motor vehicles often ignored their tax bills with impunity. 
To correct this situation, Dixwell Pierce conceived the idea 
of arranging to have local property taxes on motor vehicles paid 
at the same time and as a part of the annual registration fee. A 
bill so providing was enacted by the legislature in 1935.'O Since 
then, when Californians pay their annual state motor vehicle li- 
cense fee they, in effect, pay two fees." One is a registration fee, 
which incidentally is not deductible for federal or state income 
tax purposes, and the other is a license fee in lieu of local property 
taxes, which is deductible. 
40. Motor Vehicle License Fee Act, ch. 362, $8 2-9, 1935 Cal. Stats. 1312 (current 
version at CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§  10701-11005.6 (West 1970 & Supp. 1979)). 
41. See Ingels v. Riley, 5 Cal. 2d 154, 53 P.2d 939 (1936). 
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During the years 1911 through 1928 corporation franchises 
and bank shares were subject to an ad valorem tax, which was to 
be used exclusively for state purposes. The rates were determined 
by the state legislature and the tax was administered by the State 
Board of Equalization. Pursuant to a recommendation made by 
a tax commission appointed in 1927 by Governor C.C. Young, the 
California Legislature in 1929 replaced the ad valorem tax with 
a franchise tax measured by income, one of the alternate methods 
of taxing national banks permitted by federal law. 
The office of Franchise Tax Commissioner was created to 
administer the tax. Charles McColgan was Franchise Tax Com- 
missioner for many years. During his administration, particularly 
during the years 1933 to 1939, a great many new policies were 
instituted. Because of illness, McColgan was compelled to resign 
in 1951, at which time the position of Franchise Tax Commis- 
sioner was abolished and replaced by the Franchise Tax Board. 
For the most part, the Board has delegated its function to its 
executive officer, who for many years was Martin Huff, an able 
tax administrator. He did an outstandingly competent job of 
administering the franchise tax, the California personal income 
tax, and the California corporate income tax.42 
Under the measured-by-net-income method, the franchise 
tax for a given year is measured by the income for the preceeding 
year. Thus, the first tax under the new method was for the year 
1929-measured by net income for the year 1928. 
A. Income from Tax-Exempt Bonds 
From the inception of the measured-by-net-income method, 
the Franchise Tax Commissioner took the position that the mea- 
sure of the tax included interest on federal and state bonds, which 
could not be taxed directly. This policy was upheld in Pacific Co. 
v. Johnson. 43 
42. Martin Huff was largely responsible for California adopting the Uniform Division 
of Income for Tax Purposes Act and for California becoming a member of the Multistate 
Tax Compact. He also actively opposed the inclusion in a treaty with the United Kingdom 
of a provision that would have prevented the application of California's so-called unitary 
method to United Kingdom corporations deriving income from sources in the United 
States. See text accompanying notes 62-63 infra. He has also repeatedly and aggressively 
opposed the enactment by the California Legislature of provisions that would prevent the 
application of the unitary met3lod to either domestic or foreign corporations to the extent 
their income is derived from foreign countries. He retired as Executive Officer of the 
Franchise Tax Board effective Dec. 31, 1979. 
43. 212 Cal. 148, 298 P. 489 (1931), aff'd, 285 U.S. 480 (1932). 
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B. Rate of Tax on Banks and Financial Corporations 
In 1931 the California Legislature appropriated funds for a 
Tax Research Bureau. The bureau was organized and com- 
menced functioning in 1932 under the direction of the members 
of the State Board of Equalization and its secretary, Dixwell 
Pierce. During 1932 and early 1933 the counsel and assistant 
counsel for the bureau prepared a 200-page report recommending 
numerous changes in the Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax 
Act." One of the changes recommended related to the rate of tax 
on banks and financial corporations. 
Under applicable federal law, banks were subject to only two 
types of taxes-the tax measured by net income and local real 
property tax. The rate of tax measured by income could not be 
higher than the highest rate on general business corporations, nor 
higher than the rate on financial corporations. Banks could not 
be taxed on their personal property, such as money, accounts 
receivable, and other personal property such as furniture, equip- 
ment, motor vehicles, etc. Other corporations, including financial 
corporations, were required to pay the same taxes as banks, i e . ,  
a tax measured by income and local real property taxes, and in 
addition were subject to tax on their personal property. As a 
result, the burden of taxation on these other financial corpora- 
tions was considerably higher than it was on banks. 
To correct the inequality, the report recommended that 
banks be required to pay an additional rate of tax, measured by 
net income, equal to the proportion of net income that general 
business corporations pay in personal property taxes. To make 
certain that the rate of tax on banks would not be higher than 
that imposed upon financial corporations, it was recommended 
that the additional rate be imposed upon financial corporations 
as well, but they should be allowed an offset for the amount of 
local personal property taxes paid by them. 
Representatives of banks strongly objected to the proposal on 
the ground that it violated federal lawd5 restricting the rate of tax. 
However, Roger Traynor, who had made an extensive study of 
44. Roger Traynor was counsel to the Tax Research Bureau and the author wae 
assistant counsel. For a detailed discussion of the recommendations in the report, see 
Traynor and Keesling, Recent Changes in the Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax Act 
(pts. 1-3), 21 CALIF. L. REV. 543 (1933), 22 CALIF. L. REV. 499 (1934), 23 CALIF. L. REV. 51 
(1934). 
45. See Act of Mar. 4, 1923, ch. 267, 42 Stat. 1499, QS amended by Act of Mar. 25, 
1926, ch. 88, 44 Stat. 223 (current version at 12 U.S.C. 8 548 (1976)). 
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national bank taxation and had written an article on the subject 
that was published in 1929," was of the opinion that the term 
"rate" in the federal law did not mean "arithmetical" rate, but 
instead meant "burden." In other words, he believed that the 
arithmetical rate of tax measured by the net income of banks 
could be higher than the arithmetical rate imposed upon other 
corporations provided the total burden of state and local taxes on 
banks was not greater than that imposed upon other corpora- 
tions .47 
When it became apparent that the report's proposal might 
be approved by the legislature, the banks offered to withdraw 
their opposition before the legislature if the differential in arith- 
metical tax rates were limited to four percent. This was agreed 
to and legislation embracing the report's recommendation was 
duly enacted. The banks then began preparations for extensive 
and aggressive litigation of the validity of the higher arithmetical 
bank tax rate. After several years a case involving the issue came 
to trial in the superior court in Sacramento, California. James 
Sabine of the Attorney General's office was in charge of the case 
for the state. After a lengthy trial, the superior court upheld the 
tax. Its judgment was unanimously affirmed by the California 
Supreme Court in an opinion by Chief Justice Gibs~n. '~  
The provisions for an additional rate of tax on banks and 
financial corporations have continued in effect to the present 
time. For the most part throughout the years the differential has 
amounted to the maximum of 4%, or to approximately that  
amount. As a result of the adoption of Proposition 13 the rate of 
tax on personal property may not exceed 1% of the fair market 
value." Because of a 50% exemption applicable to invent~r ies ,~~  
the rate of tax on inventories is only V2%. Thus, for years after 
Proposition 13 the differential will be substantially less than 1%. 
It is questionable whether such a small differential is worth the 
time and effort involved in making the necessary computations 
t o  determine the amount of the differential. One solution is to 
eliminate the differential entirely. Another is to establish a statu- 
tory specific differential of Yz% or 3/r %, thereby eliminating the 
46. Traynor, National Bank Taxation in California (pts. 1-3), 17 CALIF. L. REV. 83, 
232, 456 (1929). 
47. Id. at 107-08. 
48. Security First Nat'l Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd., 55 Cal. 2d 407, 359 P.2d 625, 11 
Cal. Rptr. 289, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 368 U.S. 3 (1961). 
49. See note 6 supra. 
50. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE # 219 (West Supp. 1979). 
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complex and administratively expensive task of annually deter- 
mining the percentage of net income paid by general business 
corporations in personal property taxes. 
C. Deductions for Federal Income Taxes 
The original Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax Act pro- 
vided for a deduction for federal income taxes. The report pre- 
pared for the Tax Research Bureau in 1933 recommended that 
this deduction be eliminated. The rationale was that it was ap- 
propriate for the state to apply its tax to a corporation's total 
income without diminution for the amount of income taxes paid 
to another jurisdiction such as the United States, another state, 
or a foreign country.51 This principle was recognized in the origi- 
nal act insofar as taxes paid to other states and foreign countries 
were concerned, but, inconsistently, was not followed with re- 
spect to the federal tax. The report's recommendation was ap- 
proved by the legislature. Later, when the state adopted a per- 
sonal income tax, consistently with the treatment for franchise 
tax purposes, no deduction was allowed for taxes paid to other 
jurisdictions, including the United States. 
D. Basic Date 
The original act provided that for the purpose of determining 
gain or loss and depreciation, the basis of property should be its 
fair market value as of January 1,1928. The report recommended 
that the basic date be changed to March 1, 1913. There were two 
reasons for this. One was to make the state law conform to the 
federal, which used March 1, 1913, as the basic date, and the 
other was to permit increases in the value of property occurring 
before January 1, 1928, but realized thereafter, to be included in 
the measure of the franchise tax. This recommendation was like- 
wise approved by the legislature. The validity of the change to a 
March 1, 1913, basic date has never been litigated with respect 
to the franchise tax. A comparable provision in the state personal 
income tax was challenged on constitutional grounds, but was 
upheld by the California Supreme Court in Holmes v. 
Mc Colgan. 52 
51. A less elegant way of expressing the same principle is to say that a state should 
be able to take a slice of "the entire pie without diminution by the slices taken by other 
jurisdictions." 
52. 17 Cal. 2d 426, 110 P.2d 428 (1941). 
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E. California's Unitary Policy 
With the exception of Proposition 13, California's best known 
contribution to state and local taxation is the one which in recent 
years is usually referred to as California's unitary policy." This 
policy has two parts. One part consists of a rule, adopted in 1935, 
requiring that the formula methodM be used to apportion the 
income of a unitary business operated within and without Califor- 
nia. The second part consists of a rule, adopted in 1936, extending 
the unit method to a unitary business operated by two or more 
affiliated corporations. In these cases the income attributable to 
the state is computed in much the same manner as it would be if 
the business had in fact been operated by one corporation. A 
combined return is required that reports the combined income of 
all the different entities nominally operating the business; the 
combined property, payroll, and sales of the business; and other 
information needed to determine the amount of income from the 
business that is attributable to the state. 
Both of these rules constitute extensions or developments of 
an evolutionary process that commenced during the latter part of 
the nineteenth century in connection with the application of state 
and local property tax laws to railroads, telephone and telegraph 
lines, and the property of express companies. The owners of such 
property insisted that the value of the portion of their property 
located in any given state should be determined on the basis of 
local fair market values in the.same manner as similar property 
used in purely local businesses. Most of the states insisted, how- 
ever, that property obtains an additional or greater value when 
used as an integral part of a vast and profitable interstate system. 
53. The author was counsel to the California Franchise Tax Commissioner from Sept. 
15, 1935, to July 15, 1939. During this time he initiated California's so-called unitary 
policy and the other policies relating to the California franchise tax that are discussed 
below. He also conceived the idea for a separate corporation income tax, see text accompa- 
nying note 87 infra, the use of residence rather than domicile as a test of jurisdiction for 
the California personal income tax, see text accompanying note 92 infra, the credit provi- 
sions of the California personal income tax, see Section IV-C infra, and the rule that 
income of estates and trusts for the year of distribution is taxable to the beneficiaries 
rather than to the estate or trust, see Section IV-D infra. 
54. Under the formula method of apportioning the income of a unitary business, the 
net income from the unitary business is calculated, and a formula which gives weight to 
the various factors responsible for the earning of income such as property, payroll, and 
sales is applied to determine the amount of income attributable to the portion of the 
business within the state. Each factor in the formula is computed as a ratio, the numerator 
of which represents the portion of that factor attributable to the state, and the denomina- 
tor of which represents the amount of that factor for the entire business. See G. ALTMAN 
& F. KEESLING, ALLOCATION F INCOME IN STATE TAXATION 97 (2d ed. 1950). 
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Accordingly, these states valued the portion of the property 
within their borders by first computing the entire value of the 
system of which the property was a part and then apportioning 
the total or unit value by a formula. The formula most commonly 
used for this purpose was the single factor of mileage. In numer- 
ous cases the United States Supreme Court upheld the unit rule.55 
In the early part of this century the states began to impose 
on corporations income taxes or franchise taxes measured by in- 
come. In the case of corporations operating a business within and 
without a taxing state it was a common practice to compute the 
income attributable to the state by computing the income from 
the business as a unit and apportioning the income by the appli- 
cation of a formula. In the early days the formula commonly used 
consisted of the single factor of property. This method was upheld 
by the United States Supreme Court in two leading and well- 
known cases, one of which involved a domestic corporation en- 
gaged principally in interstate commerce,56 and the other a for- 
eign corporation that manufactured its product in a foreign coun- 
try and sold it through branches in numerous countries including 
the United States.57 
In a third well-known case58 the United States Supreme 
Court, without repudiating the formula method, repudiated the 
results that it produced in the case before it, i.e., the attribution 
of some eighty-nine percent of a corporation's income to the state 
where its manufacturing operations were located, a result, the 
Court held, that did not give sufficient weight to the corporation's 
extensive selling activities in other states. 
Following the decision in this case, the single factor formula 
of property was abandoned by the states. In time, the states 
adopted other formulas, some a two-factor formula consisting of 
the factors of property and sales, and others the three-factor for- 
mula of property, payroll, and sales, commonly known as the 
Massachusetts Formula. Many of the states, particularly the 
southern states, continued to permit, and even favored, the use 
of separate accounting to apportion the income of interstate busi- 
nesses without regard to whether the businesses were unitary or 
not. It is questionable whether even among the states that made 
55. See, e.g., Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U.S. 194 (1897); Pull- 
man's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891); State R.R. Tax Cases, 92 U.S. 
575 (1875). 
56. Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 US. 113 (1920). 
57. Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271 (1924). 
58. Hans Rees' Sons v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123 (1931). 
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extensive use of the formula method there was any state which 
prior to 1935 had specific clear-cut rules as to when the method 
should be employed. 
From the inception of the measured-by-net-income method 
in California, extensive use was made of the formula method; but 
for several years there were no definite rules as to when it should 
be used. Instead, the choice of methods was left to the judgment 
of individual auditors with little or no guidance as to when one 
method rather than the other should be employed. The rule that 
was adopted in 1935M clarified the matter substantially. At least 
the auditors knew that the choice of methods should be made 
according to a rule and not haphazardly or capriciously, and cer- 
tainly not on the basis of which method would produce the great- 
est amount of revenue for the state. 
The rule that was adopted in 193660 definitely plowed new 
ground. Prior to its adoption no other state had ever required that 
the income of a unitary business conducted by two or more corpo- 
rations be computed on a combined basis." Since 1936 nine other 
states have adopted the combined-return approach. However, 
most of the states that tax corporations on or measured by income 
apply the formula method on a corporation-by -corporation basis. 
In these states, if a corporation is dissatisfied with the results 
obtained by the formula method, it can easily obtain a computa- 
tion by separate accounting through the simple expedient of or- 
ganizing a separate corporation to conduct a portion of the busi- 
ness within a given state. The possibilities of tax avoidance by 
this method, coupled with the manipulation of transactions be- 
tween commonly owned companies, are tremendous and well ex- 
ploited. 62 
Even in 1936, when California adopted its combined report 
approach, instances of multicorporate and multijurisdictional 
businesses were fairly common. Subsequently, in an effort to ob- 
tain a federal surtax exemption worth approximately $6000 per 
59. See notes 54-55 and accompanying text supra. 
60. See notes 54-55 and accompanying text supra. 
61. Years ago the New York State Tax Commission endeavored to compel a foreign 
manufacturing corporation with a New York selling subsidiary to compute the New York 
income from the business operated by the corporation by using a conaolidated return. In 
People ex rel. Studebaker Corp. v. Gilchrist, 244 N.Y. 114, 155 N.E. 68 (1926), the New 
York Court of Appeals in an opinion by Justice Cardozo held that the tax commission was 
without authority to make such a requirement. 
62. For a comprehensive discussion of the combined-return policy, see Keesling, 
California's Combined Report, 42 J. TAX. 106 (1975). This article is based on an address 
delivered to a meeting of the Multistate Tax Commission in 1974. 
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corporation, the use of numerous corporations to operate a single 
unitary business increased greatly. Corporations sprang up like 
mushrooms on a sunny day after a rain. In numerous cases as 
many as several hundred and in some cases 2000 or more corpora- 
tions were organized for this purpose. * 
California's unitary method has been given extensive public- 
ity in recent years-largely because of its application to busi- 
nesses conducted between one or more of the states and one or 
more foreign countries. The objection to the use of the unitary 
policy has been particularly vigorous in cases of businesses owned 
by foreign corporations unfamiliar with the policy, and which 
dislike paying the additional taxes that frequently result from its 
use. A few years ago the State Department negotiated a treaty 
with the United Kingdom, one of the provisions of which would 
have prohibited the application of the unitary policy in such 
cases. The State Department intended to negotiate similar treat- 
ies with various other countries. The adoption of treaties contain- 
ing these provisions would have afforded domestic corporations 
operating businesses in foreign countries a virtually irresistible 
argument to urge that Congress, in order to prevent discrimina- 
tion against them, should prohibit the states from employing the 
formula method in the case of businesses conducted partly in the 
United States and partly in one or more foreign countries. The 
provision was defeated, and rightly so. 
If a method of apportionment is appropriate for use in the 
case of businesses operated between two or more states, it is 
equally appropriate in cases where the business is, in addition, 
operated partly in a foreign country. The location of the business, 
whether wholly within the United States or partly within the 
United States and partly within some foreign country such as 
Canada, Mexico, or England, is immaterial insofar as the ques- 
tion of the proper apportionment method to be used is concerned. 
There is ample precedent for this,63 and there is little doubt that 
the United States Supreme Court would so hold if the question 
should ever again be presented to it. 
1 Cases upholding the unitary policy 
In Butler Bros. v. McColgans4 the use of the formula method 
63. See Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271 (1924). 
64. 17 Cal. 2d 664, 111 P.2d 334 (1941), aff'd, 315 U S .  501 (1942). The case was 
argued for the state by Valentine Brookes, then a deputy in the California Attorney 
General's office. Justice Jackson of the United States Supreme Court called him into 
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was aggressively challenged. The company had its headquarters 
office in Chicago, and operated seven wholesale department 
stores located in as many states-one of which was California. All 
merchandise for all stores was purchased by the Chicago office 
and charged out to the stores at cost. The operations of the com- 
pany as a whole produced a substantial profit. By the use of a 
separate accounting computation the company reported a net loss 
for the California store. However, the use of the formula method 
attributed a substantial profit to the California store. 
By buying in large quantities the company was able to realize 
a purchasing profit in the acquisition of merchandise for all of its 
stores. In support of the proposition that the business was unitary 
and that the formula method should be used, it was urged that 
the company was able to purchase in large quantities, and 
thereby obtain a purchasing profit, only by selling in large quanti- 
ties. The store in California contributed sales and thereby con- 
tributed to the ability of the company to acquire its merchandise 
for all of its stores at a lower cost than would have been possible 
if the store had been operated separately. Thus, the California 
store contributed to the company's earnings as a whole. 
The use of the formula method was upheld by the California 
Supreme Court. In its opinion the court relied heavily on the 
relationship described above between sales and purchases. The 
United States .Supreme Court also upheld the use of the for- 
m ~ l a . ~ ~  It stated that the relationship between sales and pur- 
chases alone was sufficient to justify its use. It also stated that 
anyone challenging the formula method has the burden of estab- 
lishing that it produces an unreasonable result, and that the re- 
sults obtained by a separate accounting computation cannot be 
used to impeach the results obtained by the formula method. 
The Butler Bros. case is commonly considered as a leading 
authority with respect to the apportionment of income for state 
tax purposes. As such it ranks with Underwood Typewriter Co. 
v. Chamberlinss and Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd.  v. State Tax 
C o r n m i s s i ~ n , ~ ~  the first two decisions of the United States Su- 
preme Court to uphold the formula method in the apportionment 
chambers and congratulated him on the excellent presentation he made before that Court 
and arranged for him to take a position in the Solicitor General's office. Later he formed 
a partnership for the private practice of tax law in San Francisco with Arthur Kent (now 
deceased), formerly of the Treasury Department. 
65. Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501 (1942). 
66. 254 U.S. 113 (1920). 
67. 266 U.S. 271 (1924). 
836 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I979 
of corporate income. 
The case of John Deere Plow Co. v. Franchise Tax Boards8 is 
also an important case upholding the unitary policy. In that case 
the taxpayer introduced voluminous evidence to the effect that 
wages and the value of property were higher in California than 
in various other areas where it did business. On the basis of this 
evidence it vigoroursly contended that the use of the three-factor 
formula of property, payroll, and sales would attribute an unduly 
large share of income to California. It therefore insisted that the 
formula method should not be used, but instead that its Califor- 
nia income should be computed by separate accounting. The 
Court upheld the use of the formula, and stated that its reasona- 
bleness is beyond question. 
In Edison California Stores, Inc. v. Mc C01gan~~ a corporation 
doing business in California was a member of a group of corpora- 
tions consisting of a parent and fifteen subsidiaries, all engaged 
in the conduct of a multistate unitary business. The California 
income of the California subsidiary was computed by combining 
the total income of the parent and all the subsidiaries and appor- 
tioning such income by means of the three-factor formula of prop- 
erty, payroll, and sales in much the same manner as would have 
been employed if the business had been conducted by one corpo- 
ration. In the course of its opinion upholding this method, the 
court stated: 
The business of the parent and all of its subsidiaries is owned 
and managed under one centralized system, to the same extent 
as in the Butler Brothers case and other cases considered 
therein. Thus the business is unitary regardless of the fact that 
in the Butler Brothers case there was but one corporation in- 
volved, owning as parts of the unitary system seven different 
branches in as many states, and that in the present case there 
is a parent corporation owning and controlling as units of one 
system fifteen different branches organized as corporations in as 
many states. No difference in principle is discernible. If the crux 
of the matter is to ascertain that portion of the business which 
is done within this state, then the same considerations justify 
the use of the formula allocation method in the one case as in 
the other.70 
- -- 
68. 38 Cal. 2d 214,238 P.2d 569 (1951), appeal dismissed, 343 U.S. 939 (1952). James 
Sabine was in charge of this case for the state. The firm of Kent & Brookes, see note 64 
supra, represented the taxpayer. 
69. 176 P.2d 697, aff 'd on rehearing, 30 Cal. 2d 472,183 P.2d 16 (1947). This is another 
important tax case in which James Sabine successfully represented the state. 
70. Id. at 701-02, aff'd on rehearing, 30 Cal. 2d at 480, 183 P.2d at 21. 
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2. Extension of the unitary policy 
In Superior Oil Co. v. Franchise Tax Board7' the California 
Supreme Court held that the formula method employed by the 
taxpayer rather than separate accounting employed by the tax 
board could be used by a nonintegrated oil company doing busi- 
ness within and without California. (A nonintegrated oil company 
is a company that neither operates refineries nor sells refined 
products at wholesale or retail in various states, but instead sells 
at the well all oil it produces.) Pursuant to this decision, the 
Franchise Tax Board extended the use of the formula method to 
companies operating mines, farms, bakeries, and other businesses 
in which all the products produced in a given state are sold within 
that state. All of these companies had previously been considered 
engaged in the conduct of separate businesses. The tax board has 
subsequently gone even further, and now holds that the unitary 
policy is applicable in any case where there is strong central man- 
agement and there is centralized performance of various func- 
tions such as accounting, financing, advertising, purchasing of 
equipment and supplies, etc7* 
There has also been a great increase in the use of the formula 
method in other states. In the middle of the 1960's, many states, 
including California, adopted the Uniform Division of Income for 
Tax Purposes Act. This Act contains a provision requiring all 
business income to be apportioned by the formula method.73 Cali- 
fornia, like many other states, has interpreted this provision to 
apply only to unitary busine~ses.~~ 
Many tax administrators are of the opinion that all corporate 
income, nonbusiness as well as business income, should be appor- 
tioned. Such a policy would result in a sharp change in prevailing 
allocation and apportionment prgctices. It would also present 
serious constitutional questions in the case of corporations domi- 
ciled in other states or countries that have income derived from 
nonbusiness sources outside the taxing state, such as income from 
the rental or sale of real property not used in business, and inter- 
est or dividends or other income from intangibles that are com- 
monly considered to be located at the domicile of the owner. 
California has not as yet adopted this policy, but continues to 
71. 60 Cal. 2d 406, 386 P.2d 33, 34 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1963). 
72. See Household Finance Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 230 Cal. App. 2d 926, 929, 
41 Cal. Rptr. 565, 567 (1964). 
73. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE 4 25128 (West 1979). 
74. 18 Cal. Admin. Code, reg. 25101(f) (1979). 
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apply the formula method only in the case of unitary business 
income, although the concept of what constitutes unitary busi- 
ness income has been greatly broadened over the years. 
3. Definitions of a unitary business 
California has contributed two classic definitions of a unitary 
business-the "three unities" definition and the dependency-or- 
contribution definition. According to the first definition, a busi- 
ness is unitary if there is unity of ownership, unity of use, and 
unity of operation. According to the second definition, a business 
is unitary if the operation of the portion of the business within 
the state is dependent upon or contributory to the operation of 
the business outside the state. 
The three-unities definition first appeared in the state's trial 
brief in Butler Bros., and was later incorporated verbatim in the 
concluding paragraph of the California Supreme Court's opinion 
in that  case.75 The dependency-or-contribution definition first 
appeared in a treatise on allocation of income published in 1946," 
and shortly thereafter was used with approval by the California 
Supreme Court in its opinion in Edison Stores." 
Both definitions have been used extensively throughout the 
country. It is questionable, however, whether either of them is of 
much help in determining in any particular case whether the 
business activities in a given state constitute a separate business 
or whether they are part of a unitary business carried on within 
and without the state. In any given case there are two essential 
tests: (1) is it possible to identify receipts that are wholly attrib- 
utable to property or services located or performed within the 
taxing state, and (2) is it possible to identify the direct expenses 
incurred in earning these receipts? Those who advocate the use 
of separate accounting in the allocation of business income com- 
monly attribute to a given state receipts that are attributable in 
substantial part to property located or services performed outside 
the state. A classic example is the case of a company that manu- 
factures a product in one state and sells it in other states. In these 
cases, contrary to the practice of advocates of separate account- 
75. 17 Cal. 2d at 678, 111 P.2d at 341-42. The trial brief was written by the author, 
but the three-unities definition was contributed by James Arditto, then a deputy in the 
office of the California Attorney General. 
76. See G. ALTMAN & F. KEESLING, ALLOCATION OF INCOME IN STATE TAXATION 176 (2d 
ed. 1950). 
77. 176 P.2d at 702, aff'd on rehearing, 30 Cal. 2d a t  480-81, 183 P.2d at 21. 
8091 STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 839 
ing, the receipts are not wholly attributable to the state of sale, 
but are attributable in large, but specifically unidentifiable part, 
to the manufacturing operations. Again, in many cases these re- 
ceipts may be attributable to a substantial, but specifically un- 
identifiable, extent to management and the centralized perform- 
ance of numerous services on behalf of the business as a whole. 
This was the situation in Butler Bros. Contrary to the contention 
of the company, the receipts from sales made by the California 
store were not wholly attributable to property or services per- 
formed in California, but were attributable to a substantial, but 
specifically unascertainable, extent to management, including 
purchasing functions, performed in Chicago. Furthermore, since 
the operation of the California store benefited the company's 
business in other states it was not proper to consider that the 
expenses incurred in operating the California store were wholly 
incurred in the earning of income in California. 
Business methods have become so complex and interdepen- 
dent that it is questionable whether there is any such thing as a 
- nonunitary interstate business. Certainly instances where the 
business activities in any state can properly be considered for tax 
purposes as being separate and distinct from business activities 
carried on by the same taxpayer in other states are extremely 
rare. 
F. Commercial Domicile 
In 1936 the United States Supreme Court in Wheeling Steel 
Corp. v. held that a corporation incorporated in one state 
could be taxed on accounts receivable by another state in which 
the corporation's principal place of business was located and 
where the accounts receivable were managed and controlled. In 
the course of its opinion the Court coined the phrase "commercial 
domicile ."7g 
Counsel for tax departments in many states thought the case 
was just another business situs case and of no particular signifi- 
cance. The counsel to the California Franchise Tax Commissioner 
was of a different opinion. He believed that the state of commer- 
cial domicile of a corporation could be substituted for the state 
of incorporation as the situs for tax purposes of all intangibles. If 
so, then in cases where the commercial domicile of a corporation 
78. 298 U.S. 193 (1936). 
79. Id. at 211. 
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is located in a state other than the state of incorporation, income 
from intangibles such as interest on bonds and dividends from 
stock could be taxed or included in the measure of a tax by the 
state of commercial domicile rather than by the state of incorpo- 
ration. Instructions to this effect were given to the audit depart- 
ment. 
In Southern Pacific Co. v. Mc Colganso the California District 
Court of Appeal in an opinion by Justice Peterss1 held that the 
Southern Pacific Co., which was incorporated in Kentucky, had 
established a commercial domicile in California where it main- 
tained large executive offices from which the company's vast 
business activities were managed and controlled. The case further 
held that  the company's substantial income from stocks and 
bonds was properly includible in its entirety in the measure of the 
California franchise tax. Since then the commercial domicile doc- 
trine has spread across the country and is used by virtually all 
states that impose taxes on or measured by income. It is also 
extensively used for determining the situs of intangibles for prop- 
erty tax purposes. 
G. Interest Equivalent Provisions 
In California, as in most other states, corporations with a 
domicile outside the state have for many years been permitted to 
exclude income such as dividends and interest from intangibles 
from the measure of the tax and to charge all interest expense to 
the unitary business income. 
To illustrate, using rounded figures of an actual case, a cor- 
poration, prior to the deduction of interest but after deducting all 
other expenses, has a $10,000,000 income from a unitary business 
carried on in a number of states including California. It derives 
further income of $10,000,000 from dividends and interest. It has 
interest expense in the amount of $10,000,000. Since the corpora- 
tion is domiciled in some state other than California it could 
exclude the dividend and interest ,income in computing the mea- 
sure of the California franchise tax. The entire interest expense 
could be charged against the allocable business income with the 
result that it realizes no net income to be included in the measure 
of the tax. 
- - 
80. 68 Cal. App. 2d 48, 156 P.2d 81 (1945). 
81. This is the same Justice Peters who later wrote the majority opinion in the 
Scandinavian Airlines case. See .text accompanying notes 29-30 supra. 
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In 1939 the California Bank and Corporation Franchise Act 
was amended to provide that in cases of this character the inter- 
est must first be charged against the income from intangibles not 
included in the measure of the tax, and only the excess, if any, 
would be allowed as a deduction from the unitary business in- 
come.82 Thus, in this example, under the amendment the interest 
is charged against the income from dividends and interest. Since 
there is no excess interest none is deductible in computing the 
corporation's unitary business income. Thus the company is con- 
sidered to have realized a net income of $10,000,000 from its 
unitary business, which is apportionable by the usual formula. If 
in this example the interest expense had amounted to a figure in 
excess of the income from interest and dividends, such as 
$12,000,000, only the amount equal to the interest and dividend 
income is disallowed as a deduction, and the excess of $2,000,000 
would be deductible from the unitary business income, thus re- 
ducing it to $8,000,000. 
In 1957 the Act was further amended to apply a similar prin- 
ciple to corporations with a domicile in Cal i f~rn ia .~  Thus, if in 
the above example the corporation were domiciled in California, 
under the amendment the entire interest expense would be 
charged against the income from interest and dividends that 
would otherwise have been included in the measure of the tax in 
its entirety. In this example there would be no interest remaining 
to charge against the unitary business income, but the result is 
still favorable to the corporation. The reason for this is that the 
interest is used to reduce income which would have been fully 
includible in the measure of the tax, whereas under the law pre- 
vailing previously the interest expense would have reduced the 
unitary business income, only a portion of which would have been 
included in the measure of the tax. 
The above amendments are good as far as they go. They do 
not, however, go far enough. There is no reason why income from 
interest and dividends should be singled out for the purpose of 
determining the extent to which interest is deductible. The same 
principle should be applied in the case of any income not derived 
from the operation of a unitary business. Thus, suppose in the 
82. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE 4 24344 (West 1979). 
83. See id. The idea for this amendment was contributed in 1957 by John Warren, 
who was then assistant counsel to the Franchise Tax Board. Shortly thereafter he left the 
tax board to enter private practice with the firm of Loeb & Loeb in Los Angeles, where 
he has been a partner for many years. 
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above example the corporation, instead of realizing $10,000,000 
income from dividends and interest, had realized $10,000,000 
from the rental of real estate not connected with its unitary busi- 
ness, or from the operation of a separate nonunitary business. The 
result should be the same as in the example. If the real estate or 
separate business is located outside the taxing state, the corpora- 
tion's income expense should be disallowed as a deduction in 
computing the unitary business income in an amount equal to the 
amount of the nonapportionable income. If, on the other hand, 
the real estate or separate nonunitary business is located in the 
taxing state, the interest expense should first be charged against 
the income from the real property or separate business and only 
the excess, if any, charged against the unitary business income. 
Even such an extension of the interest equivalent principle 
does not go far enough. Not uncommonly corporations own non- 
unitary business assets, such as unimproved land held as an in- 
vestment, or stocks in corporations that seldom declare dividends 
but instead accumulate most of their earnings and use them for 
expansion purposes. Why in such cases should all or most of the 
interest expense be charged against the unitary business income? 
Perhaps a more comprehensive solution should be adopted that 
would provide that interest expense should be apportioned be- 
tween the two classes of assets-those used in the unitary busi- 
ness and those not so used-in the ratio which the value of each 
class bears to the total value of both assets. Thus, if the assets 
employed in a corporation's unitary business have a value of 
$1,000,000, and the corporation owns separate assets of equal 
value, the total interest incurred or paid would be apportioned 
between the two classes of property with the result that only one- 
half would be deductible in computing the unitary business in- 
come and one-half would be considered as an expense of acquiring 
or carrying the nonunitary business assets and would be deducti- 
ble, if a t  all, only to the extent such assets are located in the 
taxing state. 
H. The Port-Day Formula 
In the case of corporations operating instrumentalities such 
as ships and aircraft on or over the high seas, the normal applica- 
tion of the three-factor formula of property, payroll, and sales 
results in attributing a substantial amount of the corporation's 
income to the operations on or over the seas. It is commonly 
considered that aircraft operated over states or countries in which 
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they do not land do not have a situs in those states and countries 
for tax purposes. Nevertheless, the normal application of the for- 
mula attributes a substantial amount of income to those states 
or countries. 
The formula should be adjusted in such a manner as to ap- 
portion the entire unitary business income of a corporate tax- 
payer among the states or countries of the world in which it does 
business, with no income being apportioned to the area on, under, 
' or over the oceans, and none to states or countries in which the 
taxpayer is not engaged in business. Years ago the California 
Franchise Tax Commissioner made such an adjustment, com- 
monly known as the port-day formula. 
Under the port-day formula, if the vessels operated by a 
steamship company were in California ports 50 days out of the 
year and were in other ports of the world 100 days of the year, one- 
third of the total value of the vessels (i.e., the proportion that the 
days in port in California bear to the total number of days in port 
in any state or country) would be included in the the numerator 
of the property factor. Under the normal application of the three- 
factor formula less than one-seventh (the ratio which 50, the days 
in port in California, bears to 365, the total number of days in a 
year) of the value of the vessels would have been considered lo- 
cated in California. 
In the case of the payroll factor, payroll attributable to the 
operation of vessels on the high seas is omitted from both the 
denominator and the numerator of the payroll factor with a result 
similar to that obtained in the case of the property factor. Similar 
adjustments were made in the formula applicable to companies 
operating aircraft. 
The port-day formula was first used to allocate income pur- 
suant to an administrative ruling, and language supporting such 
action was added to the Act itself in 1937.84 In 1957, however, 
representatives of corporations operating steamships and aircraft 
were successful in influencing the legislature to amend the Act to 
prohibit its use as applied to them." In Luckenbach Steamship 
Co. v. Franchise Tax Board86 the port-day formula was upheld for 
years prior to 1957 as a reasonable administrative apportionment 
84. See Wahrhaftig, Allocation Factors in Use in California, 12 HASTINGS L.J. 65,81- 
82 (1960). 
85. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE 4 25101 (West 1979); 18 Cal. Admin. Code, reg. 25101 
(1979). 
86. 219 Cal. App. 2d 710, 33 Cal. Rptr. 544 (1957). 
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policy. In addition, the port-day rule is still being used with re- 
spect to other property operated on, over, or under the high seas, 
such as cables and satellites. The port-day formula may well be 
used for the apportionment of the value of instrumentalities of 
interstate and foreign commerce for property tax purposes. 
In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. u. Bradyw the United States, 
Supreme Court held that a state franchise tax measured by in- 
come could be imposed upon a foreign corporation engaged in 
business exclusively in interstate commerce. The case repre- 
sented a sharp change in the Court's position. 
For many, many years the following rules were more or less 
axiomatic regarding the inclusion in the measure of a franchise 
tax of income from interstate or foreign commerce: (1) in the case 
of a corporation domiciled in the taxing state, all income from 
sources in the state, including income from interstate or foreign 
commerce, could be included in the measure of a franchise tax; 
(2) in the case of a foreign corporation, a franchise tax could 
likewise be measured by all income from sources in the state 
including income from interstate or foreign commerce provided 
the corporation was engaged in some local business; and (3) a 
foreign corporation doing business exclusively in interstate or for- 
eign commerce could not be required to pay a state franchise tax 
measured by incomeY 
In an effort to impose upon foreign corporations doing busi- 
ness exclusively in interstate or foreign commerce the same bur- 
den of taxation as borne by other corporations doing business in 
the state, California in 1937 adopted a separate corporation in- 
come tax applicable principally to such foreign corporations." 
The Corporation Income Tax Act does not provide for a minimum 
tax nor does it provide for the suspension of a corporation's right 
to do business in the state in the event of failure to pay the tax. 
Otherwise the provisions of the Act are much the same as those 
in the Franchise Tax Act, except that the tax is designated as a 
tax on income from California sources rather than a franchise tax 
measured by income. 
The corporation income tax supplements the franchise tax in 
87. 430 U.S. 274 (1977). 
88. For an excellent discussion of this subject, see Sabine, Constitutional and Statu- 
tory Limits on the Power to Tax, 12 HASTINGS L.J. 23 (1960). 
89. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE 88  23501-23572 (West 1979). 
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much the same manner as a use tax supplements the sales tax. 
In West Publishing Co. u. M~Colgan,~~ in an opinion by Justice 
Traynor, the California Supreme Court unanimously upheld the 
constitutionality of the Act. Although in view of Complete Auto 
Transit a separate corporation income tax is no longer needed, it 
well served its purpose of equalizing tax burdens for some forty 
years. 
IV. PERSONAL INCOME TAX 
In 1933 the California Legislature enacted legislation provid- 
ing for a personal income tax, but it was vetoed by Governor 
Rolph. In 1935 the legislature again enacted legislation for a per- 
sonal income tax which was approved by Governor Merriam and 
became effective January 1, 1935." The provisions of the law are 
much the same as personal income tax laws in various other 
states, but there are several distinctive features. 
A. Definition of Resident 
At all times since its inception, the California law has taxed 
individuals classified as residents on their total worldwide income 
including income from sources in other states, and has taxed 
nonresidents on income from sources in the state. In this respect 
the California law is much the same as the personal income tax 
laws of other states. 
From its inception the law has defined "resident" as includ- 
ing anyone in the state for other than temporary or transitory 
purposes.92 Thus anyone falling within this definition is taxable 
on his total worldwide income even though domiciled in some 
other state or country. Conversely, any individual who is absent 
from the state for other than temporary or transitory purposes is 
taxable only on income, if any, from California sources even 
though domiciled in California. The regulations to the Personal 
Income Tax Act that were adopted in the fall of 1935, and which, 
like the definition of resident, have remained substantially un- 
changed over the years, explain in some detail the meaning of the 
90. 27 Cal. 2d 705, 166 P.2d 861 (1946). 
91. See CAL. REV. &TAX. CODE $ 4  17001-19452 (West 1970). The 1933 act that Gover- 
nor Rolph vetoed was drafted by Roger Traynor and the author. A draft of the 1935 act 
was prepared in the Franchise Tax Commissioner's office and submitted to Roger Traynor 
and the author for revision. For a discussion of its constitutionality, see Traynor and 
Keesling, The Scope and Nature of the California Income Tax, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 493 
(1936). 
92. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 17014 (West 1970). 
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phrase "temporary or t rans i t~ry ."~~ 
Although the California definition is quite similar to the one 
employed for federal income tax purposes for many years," Cali- 
fornia was the first state to use this definition for state tax pur- 
poses. Since 1935 a number of other states have adopted the same 
definition and in a number of instances have also adopted the 
California regulations interpreting the definition. 
B. Trusts That Accumulate Income 
From its beginning the California law has contained unique 
and specific provisions as to the taxability of trust income that 
is not currently distributable in instances where some of the par- 
ties to the trust, such as trustees, fiduciaries, or beneficiaries, are 
residents and some are nonresidents of the stateY These provi- 
sions constitute a major contribution to tax law in this area. They 
afford specific and reasonable answers to numerous questions 
that might otherwise require extensive l i t iga t i~n .~~ 
C. Credit for Taxes Paid Other States 
The practice that the states follow in taxing residents on 
their entire income and nonresidents on income from sources 
within the taxing state inevitably results in double state taxation 
of the same income in many instances. In 1937 the California 
Franchise Tax Commissioner made a survey of the personal in- 
come tax laws of the other states to determine the extent to which 
the states endeavored to eliminate the burden of double taxation 
through the allowance of credits for taxes paid other states. It was 
discovered that many states did not make any provision for allow- 
ance of credit at all. It  was further discovered that some states 
allowed credit to residents, whereas other states allowed credit to 
nonresidents. Although these provisions eliminated double taxa- 
tion in some cases, residents of the latter group of states who 
derived income from sources in the former group were not able to 
93. 18 Cal. Admin. Code, reg. 17014-17016(b) (1979). 
94. See Bowring v. Bowers, 24 F.2d 918, 923 (1928), in which the term resident was 
defined in much the same terms as defined later in the California Personal Income Tax 
Act. Over the years since this case was decided, the federal definition of "resident" has 
changed greatly. For a discussion of the subject, see G. ALTMAN AND F. KEESLINC, ALLOCA- 
noN or INCOME m STATE TAXATION 42 (2d ed. 1950). 
95. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE $ 8  17731, 17742-17745 (West 1970). 
96. These provisions were devised by Roger Traynor and upheld by the California 
Supreme Court in McCulloch v. Franchise Tax Bd., 61 Cal. 2d 186,390 P.2d 412,37 Cal. 
Rptr. 636, appeal dismissed, 379 U.S. 133 (1964). 
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obtain credit by either state for taxes paid the othhr, and thus 
were subject to double taxation. 
In 1937 California's Personal Income Tax Act was amended 
to provide carefully worked out and fairly comprehensive credit 
 provision^.^ The provisions were so designed as to protect resi- 
dents from double taxation in all cases and to protect nonresil 
dents from double taxation on a reciprocal basis. If a resident of 
California derives income from sources in another state that taxes 
the income, but allows a credit for the California tax, double 
taxation is eliminated by the taxpayer claiming a credit in the 
other state. If, however, the state in which the income has its 
source does not allow credit, then the taxpayer may claim credit 
against the California tax for the taxes paid the other state. If the 
state of residence of individuals who derive income from sources 
within California allows credit to California residents who derive 
income from sources in that state, then California reciprocates by 
allowing residents of that state a credit against taxes imposed by 
California on income from sources therein. 
As initially enacted the California credit provisions allowed 
credit for taxes paid foreign countries. However, the provisions for 
this credit were subsequently repealed for two reasons. First, it 
proved extremely difficult in many cases to determine whether 
the taxes imposed by some of the numerous foreign countries 
constituted an income tax eligible for credit, or whether such 
taxes were in the nature of a gross receipts tax not eligible for 
credit. Second, the federal law has long been quite liberal in 
allowing credit against federal taxes for income taxes paid foreign 
countries. For the state also to allow credit would permit one 
dollar of foreign tax to offset two dollars of tax in this coun- 
try-one dollar of federal and one dollar of state tax. 
D. Income of Estates or Trusts for the 
Year of Distribution 
For many years the federal government, in effect, allowed the 
executors of estates and trustees of trusts an option as to whether 
income of the estate for the year of distribution should be taxable 
to the estate or trust, or taxable to the beneficiaries. If a survey 
of the tax rates applicable to beneficiaries as compared with those 
applicable to the estate or trust indicated that the taxes would 
be lower if the income were taxable to the estate or trust, this 
97. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE $ 4  18001-18011 (West 1970). 
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result could be accomplished by the maintenance of separate 
bank accounts for trust income, such as dividends, interest, and 
rent, and then by paying charges against the estate or trust, such 
as estate and inheritance taxes, out of the funds in the separate 
accounts. By this means it was considered that the income of the 
estate or trust for the year of distribution was absorbed in the 
payment of various nondeductible charges with the result that 
there was none left for distribution to the beneficiaries. By this 
strategy the income became taxable to the estate or trust and not 
to the beneficiaries. 
If, on the other hand, it was desirable to have the income 
taxed to the beneficiary rather than the estate or trust, this result 
could be accomplished by paying estate and inheritance taxes 
and other capital charges from assets other than the funds in the 
special bank accounts in which income had been deposited, and 
then distributing the funds in the special accounts to the benefici- 
aries. By this means it was thought that the income of the estate 
or trust was distributed to the beneficiaries, and hence was taxa- 
ble to them rather than to the estate or trust. 
Early in the administration of the California income tax the 
validity of the described procedures was challenged. The position 
was taken that income cannot be identified with particular dol- 
lars or bank accounts and that, since amounts paid for estate and 
inheritance taxes and other capital items are not deductible for 
income tax purposes, the entire income of the estate or trust for 
the year of distribution is taxable to the beneficiaries regardless 
of the source of the funds used to pay the items. This position was 
upheld by the California Supreme Court in Malmgren v. 
McColgan. 98 Subsequently the Commissioner of Internal Revenue 
abandoned the former rule and adopted the California rule. 
As indicated previou~ly,~~ California adopted a general sales 
tax applicable to the sale of tangible personal property, which 
became effective August 1, 1933.1M California was the third state 
98. 20 Cal. 2d 424, 126 P.2d 616 (1942). 
99. See notes 38-39 and accompanying text supra. 
100. The act was drafted by Roger Traynor who served as Director of the Sales Tax 
from its inception until the end of 1933, when he resumed teaching at the University of 
California School of Law (Boalt Hall). He continued as consultant to the State Board of 
Equalization until his appointment to the California Supreme Court in 1940. The sales 
tax rules discussed herein were initiated while the former Chief Justice was Director of 
the Sales Tax. 
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to adopt such a tax, being preceded by New York and Washing- 
ton. A use tax was enacted to supplement the sales tax in 1935.1°1 
Today, forty-five of the states impose these taxes. California's 
sales and use taxes are similar to those in most other states, but 
again, as in the case of other California taxes, there are several 
distinctive features. 
A. Classi/ication of Tax as Retailers Tax 
or Consumers Tax 
In drafting the bill that provided for the imposition of the 
sales tax, care was taken to omit any provision that might be 
construed as imposing a tax on consumers. Many organizations 
were exempt from this type of tax, such as the federal govern- 
ment and various agencies thereof; national and state banks; 
insurance companies; and public utilities, which were subject to 
the gross receipts tax until 1935.1°2 If the tax had been held to be 
a consumers tax it could not have applied to sales to these agen- 
cies; hence it was important to make certain, if possible, that the 
tax was a tax on retailers. 
Unfortunately, representatives of retailers took a different 
position. They insisted that the tax had to be a consumers tax 
and even wanted to insert provisions setting forth a tax schedule 
and requiring that the amount of tax be added as a separately 
stated item. A stalemate developed. This was eventually compro- 
mised by the adoption of a provision prohibiting retailers from 
advertising that the tax would be absorbed, and a provision that 
the tax would be collected by the retailer from the consumer 
insofar as possible. 
Notwithstanding these provisions, the California courts, as 
well as some lower federal courts, have consistently held that the 
tax is a retailers tax and is applicable to sales made by retailers 
even though the purchasers are exempt from the tax. The leading 
case is De Aryan v .  Akers. lm However, the United States Supreme 
Court in Diamond Natioml Corp. u. State Board of Equal- 
izationlo4 recently held that the provision regarding the collection 
For a discussion of the California sales tax, see Johnson, Multi-State Taxation of 
Interstate Sales, 27 CALIF. L. REV. 549 (1939); Johnson, State Sales Taxes and the Com- 
merce Chuse, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 155 (1936). 
101. This act was also drafted by Roger Traynor. For a discussion of it, see Traynor, 
The California Use Tax, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 175 (1936). 
102. See text accompanying note 37 supra. 
103. 12 Cal. 2d 781, 87 P.2d 695, cert. denied, 308 US. 581 (1939). 
104. 425 US. 268 (1976). 
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of the tax from consumers indicated an intent on the part of the 
legislature that the tax should be considered a tax on consumers. 
It therefore held that the tax did not apply to sales to national 
banks. Presumably, the same rule would apply to sales to instru- 
mentalities of the federal government. 
Notwithstanding the decision in Diamond National, the Cal- 
ifornia State Board of Equalization, which administers the Cali- 
fornia sales and use taxes, has taken the position that as applied 
to sales to purchasers other than national banks and instrumen- 
talities of the federal government, the tax is a retailers tax that 
must be paid by the retailer on all taxable sales, including sales 
to purchasers that are exempt from such a tax. This position was 
upheld in United States u. State Board of Equalizationlo5 with 
respect to sales to state banks. 
In 1933 the California Legislature specifically exempted sales 
to the federal government from the tax.lo6 Congress has recently 
amended federal law to permit the application of state sales taxes 
to sales to national banks.lo7 Hence, the only continuing effect of 
Diamond National is to prohibit the state from collecting the tax 
on sales to other federal instrumentalities, such as Federal Re- 
serve banks, federal land banks, and federal credit unions. The 
case also presents some problems regarding the application of the 
tax on sales to Indians on reservations. 
B. The Fabrication Rule 
Shortly after the sales tax became effective in 1933, it was 





amounts of printing at a cost amounting to several 
ars per year, was planning to avoid the sales tax by 
the paper and ink and furnishing it to the printer. It 
that by this means there would be no tax on the 
charges since the printer would be performing only serv- 
ices and would not be selling anything tangible. Tailors through- 
out the state were confronted with a similar problem. They were 
fearful that customers would purchase cloth from a department 
store and furnish it to a tailor who would be performing services 
only, which the customers hoped would be exempt from the sales 
tax. 
105. 450 F. Supp. 1030 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (memorandum opinion). 
106. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE 4 6381 (West 1970). 
107. 12 U.S.C. 4 548 (1976). 
8091 STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 851 
In order to prevent disruption of business and loss of revenue, 
a rule was adopted to the effect that charges for services that 
resulted in the creation of a finished article of tangible personal 
property were taxable even though the tangible materials were 
furnished by the customer.10B This is the famous fabrication rule, 
without which the sales tax could be avoided on a wholesale scale 
and normal business practices would have been greatly disrupted. 
A survey made a few years ago indicated that all of the other 
forty-four states imposing a sales tax have adopted a comparable 
rule-in many cases using language virtually identical to the Cal- 
ifornia rule. 
C. Application of Sales Tax to Contractors 
Another rule that deserves comment is the rule applicable to 
contractors who make improvements to real estate under a lump 
sum contract. California's rule is unique among the states. Under 
it a distinction is made between so-called finished articles of 
tangible personal property, such as bathtubs, chandeliers, eleva- 
tors, etc., and materials, such as cement, brick, lumber, etc. In 
the case of finished articles of tangible personal property, con- 
tractors are considered the retailers and must pay sales tax on 
their selling price rather than on the cost of such items to them. 
On the other hand, contractors are considered the consumers of 
materials with the result that the sale to them constitutes the 
taxable retail sale. This two-headed rule has proved extremely 
difficult to apply in practice, but has been upheld by the courts 
and is still in effect.109 
D. Application of Tax to Motion Pictures 
Another rule that deserves comment is the motion picture 
rule. Under this rule, motion picture producers are considered the 
consumers of all the materials used in the production of motion 
pictures, and are not subject to tax either on the receipts from the 
108. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§  6006(b), 6010(b) (West Supp. 1979). 
109. See, e.g., General Electric Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 111 Cal. App. 2d 
180, 244 P.2d 427 (1952). 
The author was Assistant Director of the California Sales Tax in 1933 when this and 
other rules relating to the sales tax were adopted. He believed and still believes that 
contractors should be regarded as retailers rather than consumers in all cases. Many 
contractors have also recently adopted this point of view. As consumers they must absorb 
the sales tax, but if classed as retailers, even in the case of materials they could pass the 
tax on to the owner of the real property being improved. 
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licensing of motion pictures for exhibition, or on the receipts from 
the outright sale thereof.l1° This rule is still in effect to the present 
day. Although this rule has been severely criticized, it is believed, 
for reasons too intricate to discuss here, that it represents the 
correct construction of the law. 
E. Application of Tax to Leases 
Still another rule that deserves comment deals with the ap- 
plication of the sales tax to leases. A few years ago the State 
Board of Equalization proposed an amendment that, if passed, 
would have extended the sales tax to all leases of tangible per- 
sonal property. However, a t  the last minute an amendment was 
adopted providing that leases would not be taxable if (1) the sales 
or use tax is paid a t  the time of the purchase of the property 
leased, and (2) the property is leased in substantially the same ' 
condition as when acquired.lll As a result of this amendment the 
only leases that are definitely taxable are leases of property that 
has been changed substantially by the lessor between the time of 
acquisition and the time of the lease. 
In a11 other cases, lessors have an option as to whether or not 
the tax shall apply. If they wish the tax to apply a t  the time of 
purchase and not to the receipts from leasing, this can be 
achieved by paying the tax a t  the time of purchase. If, however, 
they want the lease receipts to be taxable, this can be achieved 
by giving a resale certificate a t  the time of purchase. It is of some 
interest to note that many large leasing companies, such as Hertz 
and Avis, have adopted the second alternative notwithstanding 
that it results in the payment of much greater taxes. By electing 
the option that makes their receipts taxable, they pay more taxes 
but are able to add the tax to the rental charge and collect it from 
their customers. 
VI. Sums IN OTHER STATES TO COLLECT AXES 
From time immemorial there has been an inflexible rule to 
the effect that a sovereign nation may not use the courts of an- 
other sovereign nation to enforce its criminal laws or its tax laws. 
The powers of the individual states of the United States as well 
as the powers of the federal government are limited by the United 
States Constitution. Thus, although the states are members of a 
110. 18 Cal. Admin. Code 8 1529 (1979). 
111. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE 88  6006(g)(5), 6010(e)(5) (West Supp. 1979). 
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nation that is sovereign, the individual states are not sovereign. 
Nevertheless, in the past the courts in many states followed 
the rule applicable to sovereign nations and refused to entertain 
suits or actions by other states to enforce the tax laws of the other 
states.l12 As a result, in many cases taxpayers who had incurred 
a tax liability to a given state could "thumb their noses" with 
impunity at that state's efforts to enforce the liability. A dra- 
matic example of this occurred years ago when a resident of Cali- 
fornia won the Irish Sweepstakes and shortly thereafter moved to 
Nevada without paying the California personal income tax on his 
winnings. California endeavored to sue him in federal court in 
Nevada, but the court refused to permit the suit. 
In 1937 the California Legislature enacted a statute specifi- 
cally authorizing other states to use California courts to enforce 
their tax liabilities, provided that the other states extend a like 
comity to California.l13 Since then virtually every state in the 
Union has enacted similar statutes. Thus a taxpayer who incurs 
a tax liability to a given state can no longer use another state as 
a tax haven. 
The perspective of this Article has been somewhat historical, 
but hopefully not without continuing relevance. Certainly many 
other California tax policies could be mentioned in the context of 
this Article, although the foregoing illustrations should be suffi- 
cient to indicate that over the years California tax administrators 
have been resourceful in developing policies to prevent tax avoid- 
ance and to increase the effectiveness of California's tax laws 
within a fair and equitable framework. 
Legal milestones such as those discussed here have intrinsic 
value as they encourage and perpetuate correct policies and pro- 
per administration of the law. Hopefully, too, there is an added 
value in reviewing our progress, as there are yet ample opportuni- 
ties to improve the law. 
112. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265 (1888); Moore v. Mitchell, 
30 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1929), aff'd, 281 U.S. 18 (1930); Colorado v. Harbeck, 232 N.Y. 71, 
133 N.E. 357 (1921); Minnesota v. Karp, 84 Ohio App. 51, 84 N.E. 2d 76 (1948). 
113. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE $ 4  30-31 (West 1970). This statute was conceived 
and drafted by Roger Traynor. 
